goods increased to more than 12.5 times its 1965 value. In more recent years, between 1980 and 1987, world trade in beer expanded 83.8 percent, while total world trade grew only 23.4 percent. Despite its rapid growth, trade in beer in 1987 accounted for less than one-tenth of one percent of total world merchandise trade.
On a volume basis, world trade in beer has nearly tripled since 1965, growing at an average annual rate of 6.5 percent between 1965 and 1987. The largest exporters of beer in this growing market, ranked by volume, are the Netherlands, West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and Canada (see table 1 ).' The largest importers are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and West Germany.
Beer imports as a percent of total consumption (IPC) and exports as a percent of production (EPP) are larger for some of the smaller exporters and importers than they are for some of the larger exporting and importing countries. As table 1 shows, among 25 importers, beer IPC ranges from a low of 0.2 percent in Norway to 16.4 percent in Italy. The percent of beer consumption accounted for by imports in the largest beer importing country, the United States, is about 5 percent.
Similarly, among exporters, figures for EPP range from 0.4 percent in the United States to 41.6 percent in Ireland. The export numbers as a percent of production for such countries as the Netherlands and Luxembourg, however, are questionable as these countries do a significant amount of re-exporting to other countries (that is, much of the beer reported as exports may simply be imported and then re-exported for consumption elsewhere).2
Few of the countries listed in table 1 are strictly importers or exporters of beer. Most of the countries that export beer also import some beer and vice-versa. This pattern of trade is known as intra.industry trade. An examination of the IPC and EPP statistics in table I show 20t1 (1988) notes that the Netherlands has a long history of re-exporting imported goods. 3 Ott (1988) notes that re-exported goods from the Netherlands are not included in the country's import figures.
that intra-industry trade in beer is more important to some countries than others. The largest exporter of beer, the Netherlands, imported only 4.3 percent of the beer it consumed in 1987.S imilarly, the two largest importers of beer, the United States and the United Kingdom, exported only 0.4 percent and 1.9 percent of their beer production in 1987. Ireland, on the other hand, exported nearly 42 percent of its production, while importing more than 12 percent of its beer consumption.
The degree of intra-industry trade for a country can be measured using a simple index, calculated for a given product as the absolute value Of the 23 countries for which the index could be calculated for both years, nine countries' indexes rose over the period, indicating less intraindustry beer trade. In 12 countries, the indexes declined, indicating that intra-industry beer trade had increased. Only five countries in table I had an intra-industry index value of less than 0.5 in 1987. The majority (70 percent) had an index value of more than 0.5 in 1987, which indicates that intra-industry trade plays a minor role in the brewing industry in general, although it has become more prevalent during the past 15 years.
Billions of dollars iflailons of dollars
The growth rates of IPC and EPP provide further evidence of the increasing importance of intra-industry trade to the brewing industry. Of the 20 countries in 
.Licensing •/ih'rt~~111e1sts
Brewers also use licensing agreements to make their products available to foreign consumers. A typical license agreement allows a brewer in one country to brew and market the beer of a foreign brewer. One example is AnheuserBusch's (A-B) licensing agreement with the Canadian brewery John Labatt Ltd. This agreement allows Labatt to brew and market some A-B beers, such as Budweiser and Michelob, in Canada. In return, Labatt pays a royalty fee to A-B. Of course, the licensing brewers insist that the consistent quality of their products be maintained. In essence, the licenser is selling its know-how in brewing a specific beer, the right to use a trademark and the name recognition it has buih for that trademark in exchange for a royalty payment from the licensee. There were at least 30 licensing agreements among various brewers around the world in 1987 (see table 2).
Several factors that are not mutually exclusive promote the use of licensing agreements. First, some firms use licensing agreements to circumvent trade barriers. For example, U.S. beers that are brewed in Canada under license agreement are not subject to either the Canadian federal tariff or the discriminatory mark-ups that other imported beers face at the provincial government outlets.~Second, the physical qualities of beer promote the use of licensing agreements. Beer is about 90 percent water, so transportation costs can be reduced through local production. In addition, beer has a shelf-life of about three to four months, of which two to three weeks could be taken up by overseas shipment. Also, when companies enter new markets, they often find it more profitable to license existing plants and distribution systems to handle their products rather than build their own plants and establish their own distribution systems.
The import and export figures discussed previously did not include consumption of foreignheld brand names that are brewed domestically under a licensing agreement. Thus, the degree of internationalization is understated when only merchandise trade is analyzed. Information on the amount of beer brewed under licensing agreements is usually closely held by the companies involved, and not much data are publicly available. The Conference Board of Canada, however, has estimated the impact of licensed brewed beer in the Canadian beer market and its findings serve to demonstrate how important licensed production can be. The numerous licensing agreements with breweries in Japan and the United Kingdom might indicate that beer produced under license represents a significant part of the foreign beer consumed in these countries. At least in some countries, beer produced under license clearly accounts for a much larger portion of foreign beer consumption than does imported beer.
.Fo.reiqn IJirect .Invesftnent
In addition to merchandise trade and licensing agreements, the internationalization of the brewing industry has been characterized by the increasing production of beer by foreign-owned" firms. This production reflects the increasing frequency of foreign direct investment (FDI), in which one brewer purchases an existing firm or invests in a new or existing facility in a foreign country. Like licensing agreements, FDI is a substitute for merchandise trade. Firms may be prompted to use FDI for the same reasons they use licensing agreements. In addition) such factors as lower labor and energy costs and less government regulation may also encourage the use of FDI. 
THE ECONOMICS OF •INTFHNC TIONALIZATION
Underlying the preceding description of the internationalization of the brewing industry at-c some economic factors. The next section outlines the reasons why demand for foreign beer can exist in a country that already produces some domestic brands and discusses how changing relative prices and rising income can expand the demand for foreign beer. 'I'he second section analyzes the basic economic factors that determine the type of international transaction a brewery will use to put its products in the hands of foreign consumers. A more technical presentation of the economics discussed in these two sections is provided in appendixes to this article.
'Conference Board of Canada (1989) , p. 9.°D atafor U.S. beer exports to Canada and total U.S. beer exports, exclusive of shipments to military bases, Puerto Rico and the territories, were provided courtesy of R.S. Weinberg & Associates.°C arrington(1989) .
"See Thornhill and Harris (1990) , Harris (1990) and Sherwell (1990) .
""Japan's Asahi Plans Brewery in U.S." (1990).
,,,,c,,,,,n,)r~~flr C,t fl~ Foreign Demand: Abe Attributes the low-calorie beer the rest of the time.
.Appruaeb P~ije,nnnd for .t'ore& a Eser tTan Exist
One reason why people consume foreign beer is that they can buy it at a price at which they want more beer than domestic brewers want to produce. That is, the quantity of beer demanded is larger than the quantity of beer supplied domestically at the price of foreign beer) and therefore, some foreign beer is imported to meet the excess demand. Another reason why people consume foreign beer is that at least some consumers prefer the attributes, or characteristics, of the foreign beer over domestic brands. This second possibility is discussed in this section.
In general, consumers purchase beer for the services" that the~'feel it can provide." Consumet's have a wide variety of beer brands to choose from and, subject to pr'ice and income limitations, will choose those brands that have the attributes that most closely niatch their desired services from drinking beer. Many attrib utes, such as taste, caloric content, alcohol content and packaging, distinguish one brand from another, and each combination of characteristics offers a distinctl different package of services.
Brewers differentiate their products on the basis of attributes and price. Consumers compare the package of services provided by a particular beer and its price to the services and prices of other brands. If consumers prefer the services of foreign beer over domestic beer, at given market prices, then demand for foreign beer will exist in a country.
Of course consumers do not necessarily consume only one domestic beer or foreign beer. Consumet-satisfaction may be maxinuzed by purchasing a combination of domestic and foreign beers. Suppose a consumer prefers the taste of a high-calorie foreign beer over all other domestic brands, but needs to watch his caloric intake and finds the taste of a particular brand of light beer to be acceptable. This consumer might purchase both the foreign and domestic beers, drinking the foreign beer in limited amounts, say, on special occasions, and drinking (;.,~ffi in the ,tJsn,nnit tSr 1'orsinEssr-T he demand of foreign beer can expand if its price falls relative to the price of domestic beer. If a consumer had been purchasing domestic beer, the relative fall in the price of the foreign beer may be enough to compensate him for any perceived loss in services due to switching from the domestic to the foreign brand. In this case, the quantity demanded of the foreign beer will increase. The decline in the relative price of the foreign beer may also encourage people who already consume it to purchase more. Unfortunately, data on imported beer prices are scarce, and thus the role that changing relative foreign beer prices has played in the globalization of the industry is uncertain.
Increases in consumer incomes can also spur the demand for foreign products. When consumers' incomes increase, they are able to purchase more of all of the products they desire. In general, however, the quantities purchased of some goods, like flour, decline as incomes rise, while quantities of other goods purchased, like furniture, increase as incomes rise. The statistical evidence relating beer consumption to income growth is mixed." Some studies have shown that the quantity of beer consumed increases as income increases, while others have shown the opposite.
Although little work has been done to estimate the relationship between foreign beer consumption and income in general, there is some data to suggest that the demand for foreign beer might be positively influenced by increases in income. All 21 OECD countries in table 1 that provided import data on beer had positive per capita gross domestic product growth between 1975 and 1986; 16 of these reported a positive average annual rate of growth of beer imports per capita and imports as a percent of consumption. In addition, the maiket for imported beers grew much more rapidly than most domestic beer markets during the late 1970s and early 1980s, a period of income growth for most countries. These figures roughly suggest that per capita income growth has contributed to the internationalization of the brewing industry.
"Much of the information in this section on the attributes model is taken from Douglas (1987) . "For a review of beer demand estimates, see Ornstein (1980) . Also see Heien and Pompelli (1988) . The estimated income elasticity of beer in these studies ranged from -0.46 to 0.79. Once a firm determines that foreign demand for its products exists, it must determine the lowest-cost method of supplying these products to the foreign market. Should the firm use direct exports, a licensing agreement or direct foreign investment to enter the target market? The answer is relatively simple, in theory, and is based on the principle of profit maximization.
A brewery's total cost of supplying a foreign market is equal to the beer's cost of production plus transportation and distribution costs, marketing costs and overhead. A brewery's cost of producing beer is a function of its production technology and the cost of its inputs, such as labor, agricultural ingredients and packaging materials. Research has shown that the average cost of producing beer declines as production expands." That is, economies of scale exist in the brewing industry. Economies of scale encourage direct exporting when the quantity demanded of foreign beer is relatively small and encourage foreign production either through licensing or foreign direct investment when the quantity demanded is relatively large.
Suppose a U.S. brewer and a Japanese brewer have identical production functions exhibiting economies of scale and that the firms pay the same price for their inputs. That is, their average cost of production curves are equal and are shaped as shown in figure 2. (For simplicity, assume that the U.S-Japan exchange rate is fixed throughout and, given this exchange rate, Japanese prices are stated in U.S. dollars.) As the brewers expand production, the average cost of producing a unit of the product falls up to a point, after which average costs no longer decline but stabilize. Assume that Japanese demand exists for a beer-called Colony-produced by the U.S. firm. The U.S. firm must determine whether it can supply the Japanese market cheaper by producing Colony domestically and exporting or by producing it in Japan, either under license or by FDI. Now suppose that supply and demand conditions and price in the U.S. are such that American consumers consume Q,,, units of Colony, as shown in figure 2. (Note that the supply and demand curves are not shown in figure 2 and the quantity Q m is simply given.) This substantial amount of consumption allows the U.S. firm to achieve significant economies of scale, producing Q 0~u nits of Colony at an average cost of C, per unit. Also assume that market conditions are such that a relatively small quantity of Colony, Q,, , is demanded in Japan. Since the U.S. brewer is already producing some Colony for domestic consumption, expanding production to meet the extra demand of Colony in Japan would allow the U.S. brewer to move down its average cost-of-production curve from point A to point B, where it could produce Colony for C."
The alternative to producing the beer in the United States and exporting it is to produce Colony in Japan. Since Colony is currently not being produced in Japan, the Japanese firm or branch brewery built by the U.S. firm would have to brew the relatively small amount of Colony, Q,, , at a high average cost of production, C,. In other %vords, the relatively small quantity of production will not allow the Japanese plants to achieve significant economies of scale. Thus, producing Colony in the United States for export would save the brewer C, -C, per unit of Colony. If the cost of transporting Colony to Japan and distributing Colony in Japan is less than the difference between C, and C,, then the U.S. brewer would maximize pt'ofits by exporting Colony to Japan. If the quantity demanded of Colony in Japan were larger, it might be more profitable for the brewer to use a licensing agreement or foreign direct investment.
Suppose that the quantity of Colony sold in Japan grows to Q, 2 as shown in figure 3 , while sales of Colony in the United States remain at Q~-Since the U.S. brewer has exhausted its economies of scale, it cannot produce Q 0~+ Q,, at a lower per unit cost than that for Q 0~+ Q, 1 . The Japanese brewery, however, by increasing production from Q,, to Q,, could now match the U.S. brewer's cost of production because it has also achieved the lowest possible average cost of production. Thus, given equal average ' 4 Elzinga (1973) , Fuss and Gupta (1981) , Keithman (1978) and Scherer (1973) all provide evidence that economies of scale exist in the brewing industry. See Thompson (1985) or any micro-economic text for a discussion of the reasons why economies or diseconomies of scale can exist at the plant level. production costs, the U.S. firm will now prefer to either negotiate a licensing agreement with the Japanese brewer or use FDI, thereby saving the additional export-related expenses of shipping Colony overseas and distributing it within Japan.
Like transportation costs, trade barriers also offset production cost advantages. If a target country has high tariffs or distribution systems for imported goods that are relatively costly, production cost advantages in the home country may be offset and licensing and foreign direct investment become the only feasible methods of entering the target market. As shown below, trade barriers have had a significant effect on the choice of licensing agreements and foreign direct investment in the internationalization of the brewing industry.
In Japan, two types of barriers inhibit foreign beer from entering the country. The most significant of these is the Japanese distribution system. The Japanese have a complex multitiered system, comparable to the U.S. beer distribution system, in which beer moves from producer to wholesaler to consumer.' 6 In addition, Japan has little warehouse space, which means shipments are smaller and more frequent than in the United States. Both aspects of the Japanese distribution system raise the cost of distributing beer in Japan, relative to less complex systems. Japan also charges a small customs duty on imported beer. These factors raise the cost of exporting beer to Japan and make licensing agreements or foreign direct investment relatively more attractive methods of selling beer in Japan.
A GATT panel ruled in 1988 that specific practices of the Canadian provincial governments discriminated against imported beer." Canadian trade barriers include discriminatory mark-ups at provincial liquor outlets and different marketing techniques for foreign beer, such as smaller packages and warm foreign beer sales at the governmental outlets. These non-tariff barriers have prompted U.S. brewers to use licensing agreements in Canada even though several brewers have U.S. plants that are located quite close to the Canadian border. The Australian brewer Elders IXL has chosen to use foreign direct investment to enter the Canadian market. This creates an interesting situation in which a U.S. beer is being made under license in a Canadian brewery that is partially owned by an Australian brewer.
As in Japan, distribution practices are the main barriers to trade in the United Kingdom. Most beer consumed in the United Kingdom is draft beer, and most of this is sold in pubs. Many pubs are owned outright by breweries, managed by the breweries or leased to individuals who enter into exclusive supply agreements with the breweries. This system was the subject of eight investigations between 1966 and 1986, that focused chiefly on pricing and supply competition.'~Given the relationship between the pubs and the domestic breweries, foreign label brewers have problems getting local brewers to carry their products in British pubs. Thus, many foreign brewers have chosen to use licensing agreements with domestic firms to penetrate the U.K. beer market. Foreign direct investment has also been used to enter this market.
The brewing industry has evolved from an industry that concentrated on domestic markets to one that views itself as part of a global market. This internationalization has occurred via the use of merchandise trade, licensing agreements and foreign direct investment. Merchandise trade in beer has developed in an intraindustry pattern, whereas international transactions in licensing agreements and foreign direct investment have not developed, in general, in a bilateral pattern. Licensed production and production at foreign-owned breweries likely account for an unknown, but probably large, part of foreign beer consumption in some countries.
"See VandeWater and Curiey (1990 (1966, 1971) , can he used to show how demand for foreign beer can exist in a country in which domestic brands are already produced.' Suppose a consumer chooses between two brands of beer so that, subject to income limitations, his satisfaction from the services provided by the beer is maximized. For simplicity, assume the consumer values only two attributes of beer: taste and low calories. The two types of beer provide these attributes in differing proportions and at different prices.
After' sampling both products, the consumer rates each brand on a scale of I to 3, 3 being best, for both taste and calorie content, as shown in table Al. Brand F is a foreign beer that tastes great, but is high in calories (thus receiving a low rating on caloric content) giving it a relatively high ratio of taste-to-calorie appeal. Brand D, a domestic beer, does not taste quite as good, hut is very low in calories. This beer then has a relatively low taste-to-calorie appeal ratio. 'l'he amount of each beer the consumer can purchase is determined by his income and the price of the products. Assume that the consumer has decided to spend 512 on beer during a visit to a local bar and the cost of each kind of beer is as shown in The two products are depicted in figure Al in an attribute space as rays from the origin. The slope of each ray is determined by the ratio of taste to calorie appeal. If the consumer drinks hr-and F, then he moves out along ray F, absorbing the two attributes in a ratio of 3:1. Points A and B represent the maximum amount of the two attributes that can he obtained by consuming beers F and D, respectively, given the~spend-ing constraint of $12.
Joining points A and B provides the consumer's efficiency frontier. The efficiency fr-ontier is the outer boundary of the attainable combination of the two attributes, given the budget constraint of $12. It is called efficient because a utilitymaxinizing consumer will get more utility by being on the frontier rather than within the frontier, even though these interior points are attainable. 
Maximization of Utility by Consuming Both Domestic and Foreign Beer
Flow do we know which beer, or combination of beers, the consumer will choose? In the attributes model, consumer' preferences between attributes can be expressed using indifference curves. Like indifference curves used to express the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between two products, the attribute indifference curves express the MRS between attributes, and higher indifference curves represent higher levels of utility. The beer consumer's assumed attribute indifference curves I, and 11 have been superimposed on the attribute space in figure Al. Assuming that a consumer wishes to maximize his satisfaction from taste and caloric content, he would choose to be on the highest attainable indifference curve, which occurs at point B in figur-e Al.
The position and slope of the indifference curves will determine the brand or brands of beer chosen. This particular consumer has an indifference curve that is relatively steep indicating that, compared with a consumer with a flat indifference curve, he is willing to give up a lot of taste to get a few less calories. Now suppose that a different consumer, who gives the beers the same attribute ratings, is willing to consume a lot more calor'ies to gain a bit better taste. The shape of this consumer's indifference curve would be more flat, and as shown in figure AZ, this person would choose the foreign brand F, at point A. Thus, in a society where some consumers prefer the attributes of foreign beers over domestic beers, a demand for foreign beer will exist. Figure A3 shows an example of a consumer' who would purchase both foreign and some domestic beer. Neither of the beers provides the attributes exactly in the ratio represented by point N. The consumer could reach this point, however, by consuming some of both products. By consuming L units of the domestic brand, the consumer would obtain Y, units of taste and X, units of caloric appeal. By spending the rest of his budget on brand F, the consumer would travel along the path LN, which has the same slope as ray F, to obtain the X,-X units of calorie appeal and the Y 2 -Y units of taste needed to reach his maximum level of utility at point N. Alternatively, the consumer could have started by consuming M units of brand F and then consumed L units of brand 13 to reach point N.
Grnni:h in IT'&j,:nflpn,nnd The demand for foreign beer can increase if the relative price of the foreign beer falls. As shown in figure A4 , when the price of the foreign beer falls, the maximum amount of the foreign brand that can he purchased increases, Expanding incomes can also explain increased consumer demand for foreign beer. In figure  AS , the consumer's increase in income has led to a shift from buying only the domestic beer to buying some of both beers. Initially the consumer's efficiency frontier is AB, the highest indifference curve attainable is I, and the consumer purchases only the domestic product 13. When the consumer's income increases, the efficiency frontier shifts out in a parallel fashion to A'B', because prices and attributes are fixed and only income is changing. For the given prices and attributes, the increased income allows more consumption of each beer. To maximize utility, the consumer shifts to point C on the higher indifference curve I,, where he consumes some of both brands of beer. Thus, a higher level of income has induced the consumer to purchase more of the foreign brand of beer.
Of course, the example could have been constructed to show how a shift in the consumer's income could have led to a reduction in the amount of foreign beer purchased. Several researchers have estimated the demand for beer, but no conclusive evidence has been provided as to whether beer consumption expands as a consumer's income expands. Some data, as discussed in the text, however, suggest that the demand for foreign beer might be positively influenced by increases in income. The goal is to determine which type of international transaction allows the firm to provide Colony to the Japanese market at the lowest cost. First, consider the U.S. brewer's cost of producing and exporting Colony to Japan. Assume for a given market price, the quantity of Colony demanded in the United States is Q~, as shown in figure B3 . The U.S. brewer produces this amount at an average cost of C, per unit. Now suppose that for a given price, the quantity demanded of Colony in Japan is Q,,, as shown in Figures B3 and B4 . Since the U.S. brewer already produces some Colony for domestic consumption, by expanding production to Q~+Q,to meet the export demand, the U.S.
brewery could move down its LRAC curve from point A to B in figure B3 , lowering its average cost of producing Colony from C, to C,.' If the quantity demanded of Colony in Japan was larger, at Q,,, the U.S. brewery's average cost of pr'oducing it would fall even further to C, at point C. By doing a similar analysis for other quantities of U.S. exports, we can develop the ,with the production of these quantities in Japan, LRAC,. It shows that the average cost faced by the U.S. brewer producing a given amount of Colony for export is lower than the Japanese br'ewer's average cost, LRAC,, up to the quantity Q,,, but higher for all subsequent levels. This is possible, even when cost cur'ves are identical across countries, because the U.S. plant was already producing Colony for domestic consumption and that by expanding production to meet export demand, the average cost of producing Colony fell. The Japanese plant curr'ently is not producing any Colony; if it were to start brewing Colony for Japanese consumption, it would have to start at a higher cost on its long-run average cost curve. Economies of scale, however, do not continue indefinitely. Consequently, the cost of producing 'For simplicity, the analysis ignores any potential sales price decline in the United States that may stem from the brewer achieving greater economies of scale. Thus, the quantity demanded in the United States, after production is increased to meet export demand, is assumed to remain at the same level as before export production occurred. Colony eventually starts to rise and the Japanese plant can produce Colony cheaper than the U.S. plant after point Q,,.
Thus far, the discussion has focused solely on the cost of producing Colony. Transportation and distribution costs are likely to influence where production is located. Assume that it costs the same per unit to ship and distribute a small amount of Colony as it does a large amount of Colony. Since the U.S. plant has to ship Colony overseas, it is reasonable to assume that its transportation and distribution costs will be significantly higher than a Japanese plant's would be if Colony were produced there. Adding these average per unit transportation and distribution costs to the plant's respective long-run average cost of production curves gives the two dashed lines, LRAC~5+t~, and LRAC,+t,, shown in figure B4 . The U.S. plant can produce, transpor't and distribute Colony to the Japanese market at a lower cost than the Japanese brewery can up to the quantity Q. Notice that the additional costs of transportation and distribution have lowered the quantity at which the U.S. brewery can compete from Q,, to Q'. At quantities beyond Q', the Japanese firm can produce and distribute Colony for less than C,, giving it a cost advantage over the U.S. brewer.'
Because of the cost advantage, for any given quantity of Colony demanded in Japan up to Q, the U.S. firm would prefer to produce Colony domestically and export the product to Japan. If the quantity of Colony demanded in Japan were greater than Q', the U.S. firni would either attempt to negotiate a licensing agreement with the Japanese brewer or purchase or build a Japanese brewery for production of Colony.
Whether the U.S. brewer would choose to license production or open a branch brewery in Japan would depend on several factors. Horstmann and Markusen (1987) note that if the Iicensee and the plant to be built or purchased are equally efficient, then the need to give the licensee the incentive to maintain the reputation of the licenser's product will result in FDI always dominating the use of licensing. They also conclude, however, that if the licensee and branch plant are not equally efficient-that is, if their LRAC curves are not identical-then other factor-s such as the size of the market, the existence of close substitutes in the target market and the level of interest rates in the two countries will determine whether licensing agreements or FDI will be used.
In addition to production and distribution costs, brewers also face tariff and non-tar'iff trade barriers, which raise the cost of supplying a country with beer. In terms of figure B4 , it is conceivable that the U.S. brewery could have an average cost of production considerably below br'eweries in Japan, but that trade barriers in Japan are so high that licensing agreements or foreign direct investment become the preferr'ed method of supplying the foreign country at all levels of demand. Here, the LRAC~~+t 0 , curve can be used to incorpor'ate this idea. Let the t,,ṽ ariable now stand for transportation and distm'ibution as well as costs associated with trade barriers, such as tariffs. The existence of trade barr'iers simply shifts the U.S. brewer's export cost curve upward, pushing Q' closer to the origin.
Other realistic problems associated with international transactions have been ignored in this example. Some of the other factors that would affect how a firm supplies a foreign market include differences in production technology and input costs, government restrictions on foreign investment, costs of negotiating and monitoring licensing agreements, exchange-rate movements and the role other products being produced at the breweries might have on the plant's cost of production.
20f course, the Japanese firm will eventually reach its points of diseconomies of scale and its average cost of production will rise above C,,
